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THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: AN UNNECESSARY LOOPHOLE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy, which
provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,"' is the oldest of guarantees
in the Bill of Rights. 2 Having survived the Dark Ages, the belief in
double jeopardy protection reflects the pervasive influence of deeply
entrenched Western legal doctrine, from canon law to English com-
mon law. 3 Despite its eloquent simplicity, however, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause presents underlying complexities for both lay and legal
theorists. Like the chameleon, the concept of double jeopardy triggers
different interpretations among various state jurisdictions, provokes
different judicial standards depending on whether a defendant is
acquitted or convicted, and may allow multiple trials that produce
multiple punishments. 4 The interpretation of this seemingly simple
Clause may affect three distinct protections afforded to a defendant:
the bar of a second prosecution for the same offense after an
acquittal, the bar of a second prosecution for the same offense after
a conviction, and the bar of multiple punishments for the same
offense after a conviction.'
The dual sovereignty6 exception (the Exception)7 to the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which allows for successive prosecutions of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. George C. Thomas, III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 827, 828 (1988).
3. Id. at 836-37.
4. Id. at 830-31.
5. Id. at 830.
6. "Sovereignty" is defined as the "[slupremacy of authority or rule as exercised
by a sovereign." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1169 (2d ed. 1982). A
sovereign is a "person, body, or state in which independent and supreme
authority is vested." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (6th ed. 1990).
7. The Exception was created to address those situations where a criminal offense
violates the laws of separate sovereigns. See Michael Dawson, Note, Popular
Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE
L.J. 281, 290-92 (1992). Such a violation may arise whenever sovereigns derive
their power from different sources. Id. While either the federal government or
the state may prosecute an offender, neither may preempt the power of the
other without specific statutory mandates. See, e.g., United States v. Vignola,
464 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 n.23 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979),
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same offense by separate governing bodies, is but one aspect of
double jeopardy protection which leads to confusion and controversy
in the delicate balance between individual rights and the government's
police power. A classic example of this controversy was illustrated
when the Exception was used to allow the successive prosecutions of
police officers involved in the Rodney King beating! In the wake of
the most devastating urban riot in recent years, the United States
Department of Justice brought charges of federal civil rights viola-
tions against those officers after their state trial had concluded. 9 To
many citizens, the officers' second trial was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. I0 A substantial number of the ju-
diciary ag:eed, including thirty percent of state and ten percent of
federal judges who responded to a Gallup poll of 401 members of
the judiciary."
The apparent lack of judicial uniformity regarding the use of
the Exception in the King case is somewhat surprising, in light of a
1959 Supreme Court decision which held that a single offense can
violate both the sovereignty of the state where the act occurred and
the sovereignty of the United States.' 2 Under this theory, the state
and the federal government act as separate governing bodies, each
having the opportunity to prosecute conduct in violation of their
respective laws.' 3 Accordingly, despite the protections afforded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause, an individual may remain in jeopardy
of successive adjudications emanating from a single act if that act
violates the laws of separate sovereigns.
Territorial distinctions further obfuscate the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in situations where an accused initiates a
criminal offense in one state and completes the offense in another.' 4
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980) (reiterating that the power to regulate
racketeering activities is not reserved to the states by the Commerce Clause).
See generally Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961, 1965 (1962) (expressly limiting proper venue to any United States
District Court).
8. Seth Mydans, Verdict in Los Angeles; 2 of 4 Officers Found Guilty in Los
Angeles Beating, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, at 1.
9. Id.
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. Gary A. Hengstler, How Judges View Retrial of L.A. Cops, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1993, at 70.
12. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-96 (1959) (concluding that two
crimes have been committed, one against each sovereign).
13. Id. at 191-92.
14. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1985) (continuing nature of
crime traversing two different states gave both states the necessary jurisdiction
to successively prosecute accused without violating double jeopardy); Frasher
v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 447, 260 A.2d 656, 661, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959
(1970) (holding that continuous travel into Maryland from another state gave
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Unless one of the states has a statutory provision prohibiting dual
prosecutions based on territorial jurisdiction alone, an accused may
be put in jeopardy twice merely by driving into the other state.,5
Similarly, an accused may also be tried twice if the offense occurs
on American-Indian territory, because the American-Indian tribunal
and the federal government are each separate sovereigns with inde-
pendent prosecutorial powers. 16
As the above examples demonstrate, the use of the Exception
to allow successive prosecutions of the same offense by separate
governing bodies erodes much of the protection afforded to a defen-
dant by the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Comment further explores
this erosion by examining the relationship between the Exception and
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. First, the Com-
ment explores the history and development of the Exception and
focuses on the interpretations which Maryland and the Fourth Circuit
have given to issues inherent in its application. The Comment also
surveys the constitutional, statutory, and common-law policies that
other jurisdictions have in place regarding double jeopardy. Finally,
the Comment explores alternatives to the Exception, including ar-
guments for an absolute bar to its use and suggested alternatives to
Maryland's current legislative silence on the Exception.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EXCEPTION
A. An Historical Perspective
As originally worded, the Double Jeopardy Clause stated that
"[n]o person shall be subject . . . to more than one punishment or
one trial for the same offense."1 7 Interestingly, a proposed addendum
to the Bill of Rights, which would have added the words "by any
law of the United States" to the conclusion of the foregoing provi-
sion, was defeated.' If adopted, this addendum would have limited
successive prosecutions in federal court, but not those between federal
and state courts.19 It has been argued that failure to gain passage of
the addendum strengthens the argument that the Fifth Amendment
Maryland proper jurisdiction to successively prosecute, without violating de-
fendant's double jeopardy rights).
15. Heath, 474 U.S. at 92-93; Frasher, 8 Md. App. at 447, 260 A.2d at 661.
16. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328-32 (1978).
17. Comment, Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments for
Offenses Arising Out of Same Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 534, 537 n.17 (1960).
18. Id.
19. See id.
19941
bars successive trials between any jurisdiction, and not merely those
occurring in federal courts.
20
The argument for a broad interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause is further strengthened when one considers that at the time
of the Fifth Amendment's passage, common law prohibited second
prosecutions after previous convictions in other jurisdictions. 21 Be-
cause federal law was then in its infancy, common law provided the
minimal standards under which the Bill of Rights was interpreted.22
Since the first ten amendments have subsequently been interpreted
as providing broader individual liberties than those provided by
common law, 23 reading the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar dual
prosecutions in any two jurisdictions would have been a logical
extension of then existing standards.
Nonetheless, a broad interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in the
leading case of United States v. Lanza.24 In that case, the Court
permitted a federal prosecution for violations of the National Pro-
hibition Act following the defendant's prior conviction in state court
for the same offense.25 The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy applied only to successive trials
in federal court for the same offense. 26 The Court's decision was
predicated on the concept of federalism, 27 which is the driving force
behind the dual sovereignty principle that a citizen owes allegiance
to both the state and the federal government. 28 Thus, the theory
20. Id.
21. Id. at 537 n.18.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
25. Id. at 385. The Lanza opinion represented the first time the Court interpreted
the scope of protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment where state and
federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the law. Dawson, supra
note 7, at 290-92.
26. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 380. Thus, because the defendant's two trials were in state
and federal court, the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
was inapplicable.
27. Federalism is the term which describes the "interrelationships among the states
and relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852); see also Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959). In Bartkus, Justice Frankfurter stated:
Some recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft
device for establishing a centralized government are not only without
factual justification but fly in the face of history. It has more
accurately been shown that the men who wrote the Constitution as
well as the citizens of the member States of the Confederation were
fearful of the power of centralized government and sought to limit
its power.
Id. at 137.
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behind the Exception is that an individual subjected to successive
state and federal prosecutions for a single offense is not in double
jeopardy, because the wrongdoer has committed the legal fiction of
two offenses-one against the state and one against the United
States.
29
Nearly forty years after Lanza, the Court reiterated its reluctance
to broaden double jeopardy protection when the Exception was
significantly reinforced in Bartkus v. Illinois3" and Abbate v. United
States.3 In Bartkus, a defendant who was first acquitted in federal
court of robbing a federally insured bank was later successfully
convicted in state court on essentially the same facts. 2 Conversely,
in Abbate the defendants first pled guilty and were convicted in state
court for conspiring to destroy telephone facilities." Thereafter, the
defendants were tried and convicted in federal court for the same
offense .1 4
The convictions that resulted from the second prosecutions in
both Bartkus and Abbate were upheld by the United States Supreme
Court." In upholding the defendants' federal conviction in Abbate,
the Court restated and reinforced its holding in Lanza that a federal
prosecution following a state conviction is not barred by the prohi-
bition against double jeopardy.3 6 The Court also relied on practical
considerations of law enforcement to conclude that neither the federal
nor state government should be displaced in its ability to administer
criminal sanctions.17 Although the Court observed that our system
of federalism gives "the States . . . the principal responsibility for
defining and prosecuting crime," 38 it opined that "the efficiency of
federal law enforcement [would] suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevents successive state and federal prosecutions." 3 9
The Court used an entirely different rationale to uphold the
defendant's conviction in Bartkus. Having concluded that the robbery
committed by the defendant created two separate offenses-one
against the federal government and one against the state4°-the Court
29. Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 20.
30. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
31. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
32. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121-22. The state conviction was upheld notwithstanding
unrefuted evidence that FBI investigations continued after completion of the
federal trial, and that there was active cooperation and participation between
federal and state prosecutors. Id. at 122-23.
33. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 187-88.
34. Id. at 188-89.
35. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 196; Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 139.
36. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124, 131-33.
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found it unnecessary to extend the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4' Justice Frankfurter emphasized that "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States
any of the provisions of the first eight amendments, ' 42 including the
Fifth Amendment right not to be put in jeopardy twice. 43 The Court
supported its holding with its earlier decision in United States v.
Barnhart,44 where the federal conviction of two white defendants
who shot a native on the Umatilla American-Indian reservation was
upheld after the defendants' state court acquittal. 4
As a result of Bartkus and Abbate, the order or sequence of
dual prosecutions between federal and state trials has no effect on
the applicability of the Exception, 46 thus negating any perceived need
to rush to the courthouse to preserve jurisdiction. Whether the
accused has been acquitted or convicted in the first trial is also
immaterial to the Exception. 47
In the years following the Bartkus and Abbate decisions, the
Exception was strengthened as the federal government became in-
creasingly concerned about the ineffectiveness of some southern state
courts in prosecuting white defendants charged with murdering civil
rights workers. 48 While the federal government stepped up legislative
action to end discrimination, it was not until the Court's decision in
United States v. Guest49 that real justice was served.5 0 In Guest, the
Court refused to uphold the state court dismissal of an indictment
charging six defendants with criminal conspiracy to deprive certain
African-Americans of their civil rights." The Court held, inter alia,
41. Id. at 136.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 127.
44. 22 F. 285 (C.C.D. Or. 1884).
45. Id. at 286. With refreshing clarity, the Court recognized the bias of the judicial
system in civil rights cases: "No white man was ever hung for killing an
Indian, and no Indian tried for killing a white man ever escaped the gallows."
Id. at 289.
46. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
48. Michael R. Belknap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 How. L.J. 467,
475-77 (1982). During the years between 1955 and 1965, although there were
66 killings of blacks or civil rights activists, only three persons were convicted
on appropriate state charges. Id. at 475-76. In 70% of the cases studied by
the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, southern justice
failed to arrest suspects, failed to charge deaths as homicides, or failed to
obtain grand jury indictments against those who stood accused of the murders.
Id.
49. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
50. Belknap, supra note 48, at 492-93.
51. Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47, 749.
[Vol. 24
Dual Sovereignty Exception
that the allegation of state involvement in the defendants' conspiracy
was sufficient to prevent dismissal of the indictment.12 Thus, although
two of the six defendants had previously been acquitted in state court
of killing one of the African-Americans, the subsequent federal
prosecution of those defendants was implicitly authorized by the
Court. 3 Guest therefore represented the foundation for federal en-
forcement of civil rights statutes when the southern system of juris-
prudence failed to protect civil rights demonstrators.5 4
The expansion of federal law to enforce civil rights was a
necessary response by our centralized government to eradicate the
vestiges of slavery within the states. Congressional power to make
laws regulating state or private conduct; and thus protect individual
civil rights, has been firmly established by the long history of federal
involvement in civil rights enforcement. This history began with the
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution55 and flourished
through congressional activity in the 1960s56 and the Court's response
thereto. 7 The Rodney King case is therefore not unique in the use
of federal law to protect against discrimination based on racial
animus. 8 Notwithstanding the need to retain federal enforcement of
civil rights in a country as diverse as ours, however, a similarly
substantial argument justifying the use of the Exception in non-civil
rights cases is not readily apparent.
B. The Extension of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the States
In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Bartkus
v. Illinois,5 9 that the prohibition against double jeopardy was inap-
52. Id. at 756-57.
53. Id. at 748 n.l.
54. Belknap, supra note 48, at 492-93.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(guaranteeing to all persons the privileges and immunities of United States
citizenship, due process of law, and equal protection); U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XV (protecting voting rights).
56. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h-6 (1988); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973(p) (1988) (proscribing violations based on
race).
57. See, e.g., Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (enforcing the Thirteenth
Amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
(enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 790-92 (1966) (involving the
brutal killing of three civil rights workers by a deputy sheriff and seventeen
others in violation of civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242); Johnson v. Davis,
582 F.2d 1316, 1317 (4th Cir. 1978) (involving violation of prisoners' civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir.
1973) (involving violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
59. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
19941
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plicable to the states, 6° a defendant had no basis for challenging
successive prosecutions for the same offense. Accordingly, although
the Exception itself was likewise inapplicable to the states, the suc-
cessive prosecutions that it allowed could nevertheless take place
without any violation of a defendant's rights. It was not until 1969,
when the right to be free from double jeopardy was extended to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 6' that the legality of such successive prosecutions was ques-
tioned. In Benton v. Maryland,62 a defendant who was acquitted in
state court on larceny charges, but convicted in the same trial on
burglary charges, was subsequently reindicted on each charge and
subjected to a new trial. 63 Although the defendant argued that his
reindictment on the larceny charge would put him in jeopardy twice
for the same offense, his motion to dismiss that charge was denied
and he was subsequently convicted on both the larceny and burglary
charges. 64
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned both of the defen-
dant's convictions. 65 In doing so, the Court overturned its earlier
decision in Palko v. Connecticut,66 where it held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was inapplicable to the
states.67 The Benton Court reasoned that the double jeopardy pro-
hibition is "a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage,
6
and should thus be incorporated to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
69
The Benton Court's extension of the prohibition against double
jeopardy to the states meant that the Exception could now be utilized
by states to allow successive prosecutions for the same offense. In
the year following Benton, however, the Court decided two cases
which curtailed that ability. In Waller v. Florida,70 the Court held
60. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
61. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
62. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
63. Id. at 785-86. The defendant's reindictment and new trial was prompted by an
unrelated court of appeals' decision which held that jury selection could not
be based on an allegiance to God. See Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
124-31, 213 A.2d 475, 478-82 (1965). Because the jurors in the defendant's
first trial were selected under the unconstitutional allegiance provision, the
defendant was offered and accepted the option of reindictment and a new trial.
Benton, 395 U.S. at 785-86.
64. Benton, 395 U.S. at 786.
65. Id. at 787.
66. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
67. Id. at 322-23.
68. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
69. Id. at 795.
70. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
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that state, municipal, city, or local governments are not considered
separate sovereigns under the Exception.7' Specifically, because the
judicial power of both the city and the state government was derived
from the same "organic law," ' 72 the Waller court held that a defen-
dant who was convicted or acquitted by a municipal court of violating
certain city ordinances could not be subjected to a second trial by
the state.73
The Court demonstrated similar concerns for a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights in Price v. Georgia.74 In that case, a petitioner
who was tried in state court for murder, but found guilty only on
the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, 75 was retried
on the murder charge after the state court verdict was reversed.76 On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's retrial should
have been confined to the lesser included offense of voluntary man-
slaughter. 77 The Court reasoned that the petitioner's jeopardy for
murder ended with the first trial, where there was an implicit acquittal
of the murder charge by the conviction on the lesser offense.78 In so
holding, the Court reiterated that the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy was applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.79
The extension of the double jeopardy prohibition to the states °
led at least one court to conclude that the Exception was slowly
being eroded. 8' Other courts have offered similar predictions. In an
71. Id. at 395.
72. Id. at 393. The "organic law" to which the Court referred was Florida's state
constitution, from which both the municipal court and the state court derived
their power. Id.
73. Id. at 395.
74. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
75. Id. at 324.
76. Id. The verdict was reversed because of erroneous jury instructions. Id.
77. Id. at 327.
78. Id. at 328-29.
79. Id. at 330 n.9.
80. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
81. See People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1976), where the court stated:
The trend in United States Supreme Court decisions leads us to
conclude that the permissibility of Federal-state prosecutions as a
requirement of our Federal system is open to reassessment. Indeed,
the reasoning supporting Bartkus -has been seriously undermined. In
Benton v. Maryland, the Court declared the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy to be a fundamental right which was
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions
have also cut away at Bartkus' remaining rationale, the dual sover-
eignty theory.
Id. at 869 (citing to Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 786 (1969), and Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)).
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even earlier decision in which it observed the trend toward broader
double jeopardy protection, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit speculated that "the two sovereignties rule may
be abandoned." '8 2 Perhaps even more interesting, when commenting
on the impact of the extension of the double jeopardy prohibition
to the states, a federal district court in Virginia boldly but erroneously
stated that "Benton overrules Bartkus. But, does it overrule Abbate?
By logic, it would seem so. What is sauce for the goose ought to be
sauce for the gander." 3
Despite these and other similar prophecies, the predicted erosion
of the Exception in favor of defendants' rights was premature. The
drift toward defendants' rights evidenced by the Benton, Walter, and
Price decisions was checked, if not totally obliterated, in Heath v.
Alabama.14 In Heath, a defendant who conspired to have his wife
murdered by hired assassins pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
murder in a Georgia state court in exchange for a life sentence.
85
Subsequently, the defendant was tried in an Alabama state court on
the same charge and ultimately sentenced to death.8 6 In upholding
the defendant's Alabama conviction, the Supreme Court soundly
reaffirmed the separate sovereignty rule, stating that "[t]he dual
sovereignty doctrine, as originally articulated and consistently applied
by this Court, compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions
by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause." '87 Taking a mechanistic approach, Justice O'Con-
nor made clear that balancing the interests of concurrent jurisdictions
has no place where dual sovereignties exist. 8 Instead, the legal fiction
of two offenses should prevail when the accused is prosecuted by
different sovereigns.89
82. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 203 n.l (4th Cir. 1971). In rejecting the
defendant's double jeopardy claim on collateral estoppel grounds, the court
opined that the Exception may be overruled in the future. Id. The court
cautioned, however, that while "[tihis is an interesting speculation, . . . a
subordinate court should not reach out to anticipate the Supreme Court's
future resolution of the point, especially in this case where, as we have seen,
the record does not present a sufficient basis for the collateral estoppel claim."
Id. (quoting Justice Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy:
Waller and Ashe, 58 CAL. L. REV. 391, 401 (1970)).
83. United States v. Treadway, 312 F. Supp. 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1970).
84. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
85. Id. at 83-84.
86. Id. at 83-86. The defendant's prosecution in Alabama arose because his hired
assassins kidnapped his wife from that state. Id. at 83-84. After her kidnapping,
the assassins transported the defendant's wife to Georgia, where her body was
actually found. Id.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. .at 92.
89. Id. at 93.
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The Heath decision clarified the Court's position that prosecu-
torial discretion is best left to the individual states. 9° In its first
opportunity to address successive state prosecutions where two states
have concurrent territorial jurisdiction over the accused, the Court
soundly rejected any alternative approach to the Exception. 9' In so
doing, the Court explicitly rejected a "balancing of the interests
approach," 92 which would have allowed Alabama to prosecute the
defendant only upon a showing that Alabama's interest was not
vindicated by the first trial in Georgia. 93
C. The Current State of the Dual Sovereignty Exception
Notwithstanding any ambiguity that may be read into the Court's
use of interchangeable terminology when interpreting the scope of
state statutory double jeopardy provisions, 94 the Court has steadfastly
held onto the Exception regardless of whether the accused is prose-
cuted for the same act, 95 the same conduct,9 or the same offense, 97
and irrespective of which plenary body is the first to prosecute. 98 As
recently as 1978 the Court, in United States v. Wheeler," affirmed
this hard line interpretation of the Exception and held that the
defendant's dual prosecutions by an American-Indian tribunal and
the federal government were not barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'°° The Court reasoned that dual prosecutions were appropriate
because both the tribunal and the federal government acted as
separate sovereigns, 101 each deriving their power
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id. at 91-92.
94. See Comment, Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments for
Offenses Arising Out of Same Acts, 44 MINN. L. REv. 534, 542-44 (1960)
(discussing usage of terms such as conduct, offense, act, and transaction, all
of which may imply single or multiple violations of statutory provisions
depending upon the interpretations given to each).
95. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 (defining a single act as an "offense" against each
sovereign).
96. See id. at 88.
97. See id. at 87-88 (conceding that successive trials for the same offense in only
one state would be barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy). It
should also be noted that adjudication of a lesser included offense precludes
reprosecuting the accused for the greater offense. See supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 30-39, 45-47 and accompanying text.
99. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
100. Id. at 328.
101. Id.
19941
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to punish from different sources. 102
Although applicability of the Exception might seem well-settled,
the Bartkus'03 opinion suggests a possible restriction to what might
otherwise appear to be a bright line approach governing its appli-
cability. When the Bartkus Court examined the evidence of federal
involvement in the defendant's state trial, it questioned whether the
state trial was merely a cover for the federal prosecution.'
4
The Court did not believe, however, that the degree of federal
participation and involvement in defendant's state trial rose to the
level of a sham.'0 5 In contrast, the Court viewed federal involvement
in the state trial as support for the argument that state and federal
police powers may work closely together in subsequent trials when
both powers have concurrent jurisdiction.l° Accordingly, because the
level of cooperation required to establish a sham has not yet been
defined by the Court, and because few cases have turned on the
sham defense, 07 successful use of that defense to prohibit subsequent
102. Id. at 320-28. The federal government's power to prosecute originated from
the Constitution and the legislature. Id. at 320. The American-Indian tribunal's
power stemmed from a "primeval sovereignty" which has never been relin-
quished. Id. at 328. Wheeler was therefore distinguished by the Court from
those cases where concurrent territorial jurisdiction involves territories that
derive their power from the same source, thereby prohibiting subsequent
prosecutions between those territories and the federal government under double
jeopardy principles. See id. at 318-20; see also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302
U.S. 253, 264-66 (1937) (affirming that because Puerto Rico is a territory for
dual sovereignty purposes, subsequent prosecutions of defendants by Puerto
Rico and the federal government are prohibited); Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907) (affirming the territorial status of the Philippines
and the prohibition against subsequent prosecutions of defendants in both
federal and territorial courts); United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151
(l1th Cir.) (barring successive prosecutions by Puerto Rico and the federal
government, despite Puerto Rico's self-governance), modified per curiam, 3
F.3d 366, 367 (1lth Cir. 1993) (allowing prosecution by the federal government
because the Puerto Rican and federal murder charges required different elements
of proof), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1051 (1994); United States v. Alston, 609
F.2d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980) (confirming
that the District of Columbia is a territory; subsequent prosecutions of defen-
dants in both the District and the federal courts are therefore barred by double
jeopardy).
103. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); see supra notes 40-47 for a discussion
of Bartkus.
104. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 123 (observing that it is an orthodox practice throughout the country
for federal officials and state authorities to act in cooperation with each other
when prosecuting certain defendants).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991). Although
the Belcher court criticized the prosecutor in that case, who was both the
Assistant United States Attorney and the Commonwealth's attorney, the case
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state and federal prosecutions of a defendant may be more fiction
than reality.'
The sham defense, however, is not the sole method by which a
defendant may be protected from subsequent state and federal pro-
secutions. In the interests of fairness to the accused, the United
States Department of Justice (the Department) adopted the Petite
Policy, which is used to determine when federal prosecutions may
follow prosecutions by a state.'09 The Petite Policy states that a
second federal prosecution may not follow a state prosecution unless
there is a compelling governmental interest at stake. 10 In the absence
of a compelling governmental interest, subsequent prosecutions in
federal courts will not be sought based on the same "act, acts, or
transactions.""' If a compelling governmental interest is demon-
strated, a federal prosecutor must seek authorization from the ap-
propriate Assistant Attorney General before any multiple prosecutions
may be undertaken." 2
Unfortunately, because the Petite Policy is an internal policy of
the Department, it grants no substantive or procedural rights to a
defendant." 3 Additionally, although there have been attempts to
defend or appeal successive prosecutions on the grounds that the
was ultimately reversed on other grounds. Id. at 671. The Court's criticism,
however, is nonetheless worthy of note:
In fact, it seems to the court that if the same prosecutor simultaneously
derives power from both a State and the federal government, then
the whole underpinning of federalism is destroyed. The fact that the
two sovereigns have essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor
* creates one "super sovereign."
Id.
108. Dawson, supra note 7, at 296.
109. For a description of the Petite Policy and the guidelines that should be followed
when exercising federal prosecutorial discretion, see Rinaldi v. United States,
434 U.S. 22, 27 n.13 (1977). As set forth therein, then Attorney General
William Rogers recognized the need for cooperation between state and federal
law enforcement officials and therefore supported the Petite Policy as a means
of ensuring that the public interest in justice remained of tantamount impor-
tance. Id. According to Rogers, if the jurisdiction was "determined accurately,
and is followed by efficient and intelligent cooperation of state and federal
law enforcement authorities, then consideration of a second prosecution very
seldom should arise." Id.
110. Id. at 25 n.5.
111. See Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Effect on Federal Criminal Prosecution or
Conviction of Prosecutor's Noncompliance with Petite Policy Requiring Prior
Authorization of Attorney General for Federal Trial Where Accused Has Been
Previously Prosecuted for Same Acts in State Court, 51 A.L.R. FED.. 852, 853
(1992 & Supp. 1994).
112. Id. at 854.
113. See United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 674-75 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(denying substantive rights under the Petite Policy).
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federal prosecutor did not follow the Petite Policy, 1 4 these attempts
have been largely unsuccessful" 5 and have not defined when a gov-
ernmental interest becomes compelling.
Nevertheless, given the Court's firm stance on the Exception,
the Petite Policy should act as a safeguard to unbridled prosecutorial
discretion. But for the Petite Policy, there would be no limit to
successive prosecutions for the same offense when state and federal
jurisdictions have concurrent jurisdiction." 6 Federal prosecutors have
themselves occasionally attempted to limit prosecutorial discretion in
accordance with the Petite Policy by seeking reversal of successful
verdicts obtained by their colleagues in disregard of the Petite Policy's
mandates. 17 Such an attempt was successful in Rinaldi v. United
States,"8 where a defendant who was convicted in both state and
federal court on robbery charges had his federal conviction reversed
after the prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss the federal charges
because of a failure to comply with the Petite Policy." 9
In reversing the case based upon the prosecutor's motion, rather
than upon a similar motion made by the defendant, the Court was
merely following its obligation to favor petitions from federal pro-
secutors seeking reversals of decisions based on Petite Policy viola-
114. See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 536 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that Petite Policy provides no basis for substantive relief), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 178 (8th
Cir. 1979) (denying defendant's theory of appeal based on the Petite Policy),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564,
567-68 (4th Cir.) (rejecting defendant's argument that noncompliance with the
Petite Policy affords grounds for appeal), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979);
United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d 406, 407 (4th Cir. 1978) (ruling that a
defendant has no right to relief on the basis of noncompliance with the Petite
Policy); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (10th Cir.) (denying
defendant's appeal based on Petite Policy infractions), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
896 (1978); United States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Va.
1991) (denying that the Petite Policy confers substantive rights to a defendant);
United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 674-75 (W.D. Va. 1991) (denying
the defendant's argument that the Petite Policy confers any substantive rights
to criminal defendants).
115. Cf. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. at 674-75 & n.6 (expressing sympathy for the
defendant because of Petite Policy violations, but reversing the case on other
grounds).
116. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1977).
117. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248, 248-49 (1980) (reversing
a conviction at prosecutor's request); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22,
23 (1977) (granting a motion to dismiss at prosecutor's request); Petite v.
United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1960) (vacating a judgment and a dismissal
of an indictment against the defendant at the government's request).
118. 434 U.S. 22, 23 (1977) (per curiam).
119. Id. at 32.
[Vol. 24
Dual Sovereignty Exception
tions.12° However, it has also been argued that using the Petite Policy
to reverse decisions resulting from the use of prosecutorial powers
under the Exception is a wasteful use of the justice system in an
attempt to enforce internal, administrative affairs.' 2' Because the
Exception permits these reprosecutions, some justices would instead
choose to deny the Department's request for subsequent reversals
and thereby avoid entanglement in its internal affairs. 22 A denial of
this nature, however, would obviate the protections afforded to a
defendant by the Petite Policy, especially where no case has ever
been reversed because of non-compliance with the Petite Policy when
the defendant made the request for such reversal. 23
III. MARYLAND COMMON LAW AND THE POSITION OF
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A. Maryland Common Law
Although Maryland has no statutory or express constitutional
provision barring double jeopardy, the adoption of English common
law prohibiting successive prosecutions for the same offense estab-
lished the same prohibition in Maryland. 24 Nevertheless, in one of
the more politically disruptive cases in Maryland, the court of special
appeals permitted the state prosecution of the Catonsville Nine after
their first trial in federal court ended in a conviction. 2 The defen-
dants' prosecution in federal court was based on violations of federal
statutes under the Military Service Act, 26 while their prosecution in
state court was based on robbery, battery, and assault charges. 27
120. Id. at 29. The Court noted that "the federal courts should be receptive, not
circumspect, when the Government seeks leave to implement [the Petite]
[Plolicy." Id.
121. See Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032, 1035-36 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (opining that the Court should not be involved in the Department's
internal affairs).
122. Id. (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist & White, JJ., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114.
124. The adoption of English common law is reflected in Article 5 of the Declaration
of Rights to the Maryland Constitution, which states that "the Inhabitants of
Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury,
according to the course of the Law." MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Decl. of Rts.
art. V.
125. Melville v. State, 10 Md. App. 118, 121, 268 A.2d 497, 498 (1970) (per curiam).
The Catonsville Nine were nine highly visible Roman Catholic lay people and
clergy opposed to the Vietnam war. Id. at 120, 268 A.2d at 498.
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2071(a) (1988).
127. Melville, 10 Md. App. at 120-21, 268 A.2d at 498-99. The Act essentially
sanctioned the destruction of United States property. Id. at 120-21 n.1, 268
A.2d at 498-99 n.1.
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Although both the federal and state charges arose from the same
events, 28 the court focused on sufficient differences in those charges
to determine that they were not the same offense. 29 Rather than
emphasizing the technical distinction of separate sovereignties, 30 the
court found that Maryland's interest in bringing charges against the
defendants was to protect the person harmed by the assaultive
conduct, whereas the federal government's interest in bringing charges
was to protect United States property.13 1
Years later, finding a distinction between the charges against a
defendant became unnecessary when the court of appeals adopted
the Exception in Evans v. State 32 and its companion case, Grandison
v. State.' In these cases, the defendants sought dismissal of state
charges following their convictions in federal court on charges stem-
ming from conspiracy to murder witnesses in Grandison's unrelated
narcotics trial. 3 4 In an effort to prevent the state prosecutions from
moving forward on charges of murder, conspiracy, and the use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony, defense counsel argued that
the federal and state charges were the "same offense."' 35 Under this
theory, the state's prosecution of the defendants after their federal
convictions subjected the defendants to double jeopardy.' 36 Alterna-
tively, defense counsel argued that Maryland's adoption of the Eng-
lish common-law prohibition against successive prosecutions should
prevail, even if the federal Constitution would have allowed such
prosecutions through the use of the Exception. 3 7
The court of appeals rejected both arguments presented by
defendants' counsel, 38 relying in part on the Supreme Court's reaf-
firmance of the Exception in United States v. Wheeler. a9 Although
the court acknowledged that the Exception did not exist in Maryland
as of 1776,' 40 it nonetheless declared that "the common law is not
128. Id. at 124, 268 A.2d at 500. The court agreed that the offenses arose from
the same facts, but noted that the state charged the defendants with different
conduct. Id.
129. Id. at 124-26, 268 A.2d at 500-01.
130. See id. at 125-26, 268 A.2d at 500-01.
131. Id. at 124-25, 268 A.2d at 500-01.
132. 301 Md. 45, 481 A.2d 1135 (1984).
133. 301 Md. 45, 481 A.2d 1135 (1984).
134. Id. at 48-49, 481 A.2d at 1136-37.
135. See id. at 49-50, 481 A.2d at 1137-38 (assuming state and federal charges are
the same, the Exception removes the case from the prohibition against double
jeopardy).
136. Id. at 49-50, 481 A.2d at 1137.
137. Id. at 50, 481 A.2d at 1137.
138. Id. at 53-58, 481 A.2d at 1139-41.
139. 435 U.S. 313 (1978); see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
140. Evans, 301 Md. at 57, 481 A.2d at 1141.
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static and may be changed by decisions of the Court . . . .Therefore
this Court has adopted, as a matter of Maryland common law, the
dual sovereignty concept delineated in the Supreme Court's Bartkus
and Abbate cases. 1 4 1
Although Evans involved the separate sovereigns of state and
federal government, the Exception has also been adopted by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland when the separate sovereigns are two
states. In Bailey v. State, 42 the defendant was tried and convicted in
New Jersey for receiving stolen goods. 143 Because Maryland had
territorial jurisdiction for the crime, which continued through both
states, 1" the defendant was subsequently tried and convicted in
Maryland for robbery with a deadly weapon. 45 In rejecting the
defendant's argument that Maryland common law prohibited his
multiple prosecutions, the court maintained a strict adherence to the
Exception, holding steadfast to the theory that New Jersey and
Maryland are separate sovereigns.' 46
The use of the Exception in situations where the two sovereignties
are separate states was recently reaffirmed by Maryland in Gillis v.
State. 47 There, the defendant was acquitted by the State of Delaware
on charges of murder. 4 After the victim's body was found in
Maryland, the defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of
first degree murder by the State of Maryland.'4 9
On appeal from the Maryland conviction, the court of appeals
rejected the defendant's argument that Maryland violated the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution by refusing
to honor Delaware's decision of acquittal. 50 Opining that the "double
jeopardy door [was] slammed tightly shut,"'' the court held that the
dual sovereignty rationale was also applicable to the Full Faith and
141. Id. at 57-58, 481 A.2d at 1141. The dual sovereignty concept permits dual
prosecutions by state and federal sovereigns. See supra notes 29-47 and accom-
panying text.
142. 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985).
143. Id. at 660, 496 A.2d at 670.
144. See id. at 653-54, 496 A.2d at 666-67.
145. Id. at 654, 496 A.2d at 667.
146. Id. at 660, 496 A.2d at 670.
147. 333 Md. 69, 633 A.2d 888 (1993).
148. Id. at 71, 633 A.2d at 889.
149. See id. at 71-72, 633 A.2d at 889. At the time of the Delaware trial, the
victim's body had not been located. Id. at 71, 633 A.2d at 889.
150. Id. The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads as follows: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
151. Gillis, 333 Md. at 76, 633 A.2d at 891.
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Credit Clause. 52 The court observed that a contrary result would
deny Maryland the power to enforce its laws if the defendant first
raced to the court house in Delaware.153
B. The Position of the Fourth Circuit
Like Maryland, the Fourth Circuit also adheres to the Excep-
tion."5' One of the earliest cases to signify this adherence was Sin-
gleton v. United States,'55 where the court affirmed the defendant's
federal conviction for violation of the National Prohibition Act
following her previous conviction in state court for possession of
liquor. 5 6 Although the defendant argued that her subsequent prose-
cution in federal court subjected her to double jeopardy,17 the court
relied on United States v. Lanza 8 to support its holding that a
federal prosecution following a state court conviction does not violate
the prohibition against double jeopardy. 59
In a more recent decision, the Fourth Circuit held that a violation
of the prohibition against double jeopardy also does not occur when
a federal prosecution follows a state court acquittal.' 60 In United
States v. Sutton,'6' a defendant who was acquitted in state court for
receiving and stealing securities was subsequently indicted in federal
court for violating a federal statute prohibiting the interstate trans-
portation of false securities with fraudulent intent. 62 Although the
court analyzed and compared the elements of the state and federal
charges, 63 it noted that under Abbate v. United States' and Bartkus
152. Id. The court's refusal to apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause in a manner
that would preclude multiple prosecutions between states was based on prin-
ciples of federalism; namely, "the historic right and obligation of the States
to maintain peace and order within their confines." Id. at 74, 633 A.2d at 890
(quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)).
153. Id. at 83, 633 A.2d at 895.
154. See United States v. Sutton, 363 F.2d 845, 846 (4th Cir. 1966) (finding no
prohibition against successive prosecutions involving state and federal trials).
155. 287 F. 353 (4th Cir. 1923).
156. Id. at 353-54.
157. Id.
158. 260 U.S. 377 (1922); see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
159. Singleton, 287 F. at 353-54. Lanza involved a fact pattern strikingly similar to
that presented to the court in Singleton. In Lanza, the defendant was charged
and convicted under the National Prohibition Act with the manufacture,
transportation, and possession of intoxicating liquor, after his conviction in
state court for the same acts. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 378-79.
160. United States v. Sutton, 363 F.2d 845, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1014 (1966).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 845-46.
163. Id. at 846.
164. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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v. Illinois, 165 "there is no violation of any constitutional right in
successive prosecutions."'" The defendant's federal prosecution was
thus not barred by his state court acquittal. 167
In a similar sequence of events, a defendant who was acquitted
in state court of trying to pass a postal money order attempted to
invoke the defense of collateral estoppel to overturn a conviction
resulting from his subsequent federal prosecution.'" The defendant
alleged that because he was previously acquitted in a Virginia state
court for trying to pass the money order, the government was
collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue in federal court. 169
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized the collateral estoppel defense
in criminal cases, 170 it held that a defendant in one sovereign juris-
diction cannot avail itself to the preclusion of issues litigated in
another sovereign jurisdiction where, as here, the litigation was
commenced by different parties. 17'
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit followed the predictable pattern
of recent Supreme Court decisions in issues of dual sovereignty 172
and collateral estoppel. 7 1 In United States v. Belcher,7 4 however, a
district court within the Fourth Circuit went beyond that pattern by
165. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
166. Sutton, 363 F.2d at 846.
167. Id.
168. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1971). Collateral estoppel
defenses are generally unsuccessful because of the nonmutuality between state
and federal sovereigns. See, e.g., United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 889-90
(1989) (holding that dual sovereignty precludes the collateral estoppel prong of
double jeopardy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990). But see United States v.
Ward, 676 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.) (comparing the elements of charges to
ascertain whether charges between sovereigns are distinct or the same), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
169. Smith, 446 F.2d at 202.
170. Id.
171. Id. In this case, those parties were the state and federal governments. Id.
172. See supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
173. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). In Ashe, a defendant who was
acquitted of robbing a participant in a poker game was subsequently tried
again on charges that he had robbed another participant in the same poker
game. In addressing the defendant's contention that the second prosecution
violated his right against double jeopardy, the Court held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy" and should thus "protect [] a man who has been acquitted
from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time." Id. at 445. The Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether an acquittal in one jurisdiction would bar
reprosecution in another jurisdiction due to collateral estoppel principles. See
Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney
King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REv. 609, 643-44 (1994) (opining that a
collateral estoppel defense across jurisdictional lines would probably fail).
174. 762 F. Supp. 666, 670 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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forbidding successive state and federal prosecutions because of the
sham exception alluded to in Bartkus v. Illinois.'75 The defendant in
Belcher was prosecuted by the state for the manufacture of marijuana
and the use of a firearm while committing a felony. 76 Although the
state's case was ultimately dismissed, 177 the prosecutor, who also
served as a Special Assistant United States Attorney, switched hats
and brought charges against the defendant in federal court.178 Because
the power to prosecute emanated from the lone prosecutor, who
acted for both the state and the federal government, 179 the court
concluded that the second prosecution was a "sham and a cover"
for the first and thus forbidden under collateral estoppel principles.1
80
Although a fair reading of the Belcher decision indicates the
Fourth Circuit's cognizance of collusion among prosecutors, or si-
tuations similar to the sham alluded to in Bartkus, defendants fre-
quently find themselves unable to substantiate claims of this nature.' 8'
The inability to substantiate a sham defense is exemplified in United
States v. Byars.8 2 In Byars, a Virginia State's Attorney brought drug
charges against Byars.'83 When the evidence in the state trial was
suppressed because of an illegal search and seizure,'8 the prosecutor
voluntarily withdrew the charges. 185 Subsequently, the same prose-
cutor became a Special Assistant United States Attorney, and in that
capacity brought federal drug charges against Byars. 8 6 Byars argued
that the attorney's role in both the state and federal prosecutions
was a sham 8 7 and an oppressive dual prosecution.18
While the Byars court recognized the validity of the sham
defense, it narrowed the applicability of that defense by suggesting
that an element of vindictiveness may be required to prove the
175. Id.; see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
176. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. at 670.
177. Id. The dismissal was based, in part, on an unexplained destruction of evidence.
Id.
178. Id. at 668-69.
179. Id. at 671.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 671 n.3 (observing that cooperation between state and federal govern-
ments to battle criminal activity normally does not rise to the collusion necessary
for the sham defense); see also United States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235,
1241 (E.D. Va. 1991) (observing that federal and state cooperation while
investigating a crime is ordinarily desirable).
182. 762 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Va. 1991).
183. Id. at 1236-37.
184. Id. at 1236.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1236-37.
187. Id. at 1241.
188. Id. at 1237.
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existence of an actual sham.8 9 That element was lacking in Byars,
where the previous state's attorney had minimal involvement in the
federal case as a Special Assistant United States Attorney, and where
the federal investigation was independent of any investigation per-
formed by the state.' 90 The existence of this independent investigation
or involvement by one sovereign was sufficient to defeat charges of
collusion,19' regardless of whether the Petite Policy 192 was followed. 93
Although no bright line distinctions are currently available, Byars
stands for the proposition that something more than cooperative
investigation and assistance between sovereigns is required to destroy
the presumption that the Petite Policy permits cooperation between
state and federal investigations.191
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES-A SURVEY OF OTHER
STATES
A. A Solution to Territorial Unfairness
One of the most striking and inherently uneven aspects of dual
sovereignty is the dependence on territorial distinctions. 95 Because
189. Id. at 1240-41.
190. Id. at 1241-42.
191. Id. at 1241.
192. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
193. Byars, 762 F. Supp. at 1240 n.6. The Fourth Circuit has held that deviation
from the Petite Policy alone will not bar the subsequent prosecution of a
defendant after a state court acquittal or conviction. See, e.g., United States
v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564, 567-68 (4th Cir.) (opining that the Petite Policy is
merely a "housekeeping" provision), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). In
Howard, the arresting officer testified at the defendants' state and federal
trials. Id. at 567. Evidence from the state trial was also introduced in the
federal trial. Id. Notwithstanding the defendants' objection that the federal
prosecutor did not follow the Petite Policy, the court held that the defendants
had no right to have an otherwise valid conviction reversed due to that
noncompliance. Id. at 567-68; accord United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d
406, 407 (4th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a failure to follow the Petite Policy
does not afford a defendant any arguable grounds for reversal after dual
prosecution). But cf. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 675 n.6
(W.D. Va. 1991) (objecting to the lack of substantive rights which the Petite
Policy confers upon the defendant, one district court judge commented that
"the Petite [Policy] should confer substantive rights on criminal defendants").
194. See Byars, 762 F. Supp. at 1241-42; accord United States v. Aboumoussallem,
726 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that joint investigations by federal
and state authorities fall short of proving "manipulation" necessary for finding
a "sham or a cover").
195. Dominic T. Holzhaus, Note, Double Jeopardy and Incremental Culpability: A
Unitary Alternative to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1701-02 (1986).
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federal and state police powers emerge from separate sources, 96 a
crime committed in a particular region may be subject to different
sources of police power. 97 Although only one crime has actually
been committed, the defendant may be tried and sentenced by several
successive jurisdictions. To avoid this result, a number of states have
constitutional,198 common-law,t99 or statutory bars2°° to dual prose-
cution. Jurisdictional and substantive issues, rather than strict terri-
196. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
197. For example, a crime committed on an American-Indian reservation may be
tried successively by tribal courts and federal courts. See United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (C.C.D.
Or. 1884). Modern day courts are bound by similar territorial concerns that
serve a limited contemporary purpose. For instance, if a crime has been
committed in the District of Columbia or a United States territory, double
jeopardy precludes successive prosecutions because the police power flows from
the same source, the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez,
992 F.2d 1143, 1151 (lth Cir.) (barring successive prosecutions by Puerto
Rico and the federal government, despite Puerto Rico's self-governance),
modified per curiam, 3 F.3d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1993) (allowing prosecution
by the federal government because the Puerto Ricbn and federal murder charges
required different elements of proof), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1051 (1994);
United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (barring successive
prosecutions in the District of Columbia and the federal courts), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 918 (1980).
198. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 9; ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 10; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST.
art. I, § I, Par. XVIII; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; IowA CONST. art. I, § 12;
KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10; Ky. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 15,
ME. CONST. art. I, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. I, §
15; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 22; Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 16.
199. See, e.g., State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 845 (N.H. 1978) (interpreting a clause
in the state constitution as barring successive prosecutions after an initial
acquittal in another court); People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich.
1976) (interpreting the state constitution as barring successive prosecutions in
state court after federal trial, unless the interests of the state are substantially
different); Pennsylvania v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 641-42 (Pa. 1971) (barring a
second prosecution in state court after conviction in another jurisdiction, unless
the interests of Pennsylvania are substantially different).
200. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West
1993); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-303 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 209 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-18 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-
112 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/3-4
(Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 505.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1993);
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.070 (Michie 1993). But cf. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 597 (West 1993) ("(W]here several sovereigns prosecute, the principles
of double jeopardy do not apply.").
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torial considerations, therefore determine whether a second trial may
be brought in a state court after a federal prosecution. 20 1 Looking
beyond territorial considerations alone negates the conclusion "that
the only penological justification for permitting a second prosecution
and punishment for the same offense even where different sovereigns
are involved is out and out punishment. ' 20 2 As a result of the
Supremacy Clause, however, a state's common-law, statutory, or
constitutional bar to double jeopardy will only preclude a second
trial in state court if the first trial was under federal jurisdiction.2 3
B. State Constitutional and Common-Law Application of Double
Jeopardy
Although Maryland has no explicit constitutional provision bar-
ring double jeopardy, a number of other states do have such provi-
sions.20 4 New Hampshire's constitution, for example, declares that
"[n]o subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the
same crime or offense. ' 20 5 This provision was interpreted by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in State v. Hogg,20 6 to preclude
the defendant's state prosecution for bank robbery after his federal
acquittal on the same charges. 20 7 The court observed that the "uni-
versal practice [prior to the ratification of the United States Consti-
tution] in Great Britain, and in this country [was] that persons shall
not be brought to a second trial for the same offence."2 8 The court
further observed that because New Hampshire's constitutional pro-
vision predated federalism, and its bill of rights preceded the for-
mation of the Union,2°9 New Hampshire's constitution could be
interpreted to afford greater protection to its citizens than that
afforded by the federal bill of rights. 210
201. See sources cited supra notes 198-200.
202. Mills, 286 A.2d at 641.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Engesser, 788 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.) (recognizing
that the state statute can only bar state trials after a federal prosecution due
to the Supremacy Clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986). The relevant
section of the Supremacy Clause states that "the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
204. See supra notes 198-200.
205. N.H. CoNsr. pt. I, art. 16.
206. 385 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978).
207. Id. at 847.
208. Id. at 846.
209. Id. at 845-46.
210. Id. at 845. But see State v. Heinz, 407 A.2d 814, 819 (N.H. 1979) (interpreting
the state constitution so that double jeopardy will not bar successive prosecu-
tions when the offenses with which the defendant is charged are substantially
different).
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Michigan has similarly interpreted its state constitution to provide
greater protection to its citizens than the United States Constitution.2 1 1
In People v. Cooper,2 2 a defendant who was previously acquitted in
federal court on charges stemming from a bank robbery was subse-
quently convicted in state court on essentially the same charges.1 3
Although the defendant did not preserve a double jeopardy appeal
at trial, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed his state court
conviction on double jeopardy grounds. 21 4 According to the court's
interpretation of the double jeopardy clause in Michigan's constitu-
tion, subsequent prosecutions are barred "where the interests sought
to be protected by the Federal statute are not substantially different
than those sought to be protected by the . . . state statutes.11215
Other states have taken a more narrow view of their constitu-
tional provisions barring double jeopardy. 1 6 Although Ohio's con-
stitution provides that "[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense, ' 21 7 its court of appeals has interpreted this
clause to offer no greater protection than that offered to a defendant
by the United States Constitution, including the Exception. 218
A similar conclusion was reached by the Kansas court of appeals
in In re Coulter.2 9 In that case, a constitutional provision stating
that "[nJo person . .. [shall] be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense ' 2 0 was interpreted by the court to afford the same degree
of rights to Kansas citizens as does the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 221 Accordingly, Kansas state courts may
apply the Exception to successive prosecutions between Kansas and
211. See People v. Carter, 330 N.W.2d 314, 325 (Mich. 1982).
212. 247 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1976).
213. Id. at 867-68. The defendant was also convicted for attempted murder in the
state trial, but this charge was dismissed on other grounds. People v. Cooper,
227 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 247
N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1976).
214. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d at 870-71.
215. Id. at 871. The double jeopardy clause in Michigan's Constitution states as
follows: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy." MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
216. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 566 P.2d 1142, 1143-44 (N.M. 1977) (applying the
Exception to successive federal and state trials); State v. McKinney, 609 N.E.2d
613, 615-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (permitting successive prosecutions between
two states).
217. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
218. See McKinney, 609 N.E.2d at 616.
219. 860 P.2d 51 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
220. KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10.
221. Cf. Kansas v. Henwood, 756 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Kan. 1988) (noting that in the
absence of state statutes, the prohibition against double jeopardy is inapplicable
between separate sovereigns).
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the courts of another state if the offenses charged are different, 22
or between Kansas and federal courts. 223
C. State Statutory Provisions that Affect the Exception
The State of Maryland has no statutory provision on double
jeopardy. A number of other states, however, have enacted legislation
that covers a variety of issues relevant to a defendant's protection
against double jeopardy. 224 Of those states that have statutory bars
prohibiting successive prosecutions, there is no general consensus or
uniformity in the scope of double jeopardy protection. The range of
legislation varies from the extremely vague and simple to the highly
complex and exclusive. 221 When the statutory bars are too vague, 226
222. Id. at 1090.
223. In re Coulter, 860 P.2d 51, 55 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
224. See sources cited supra note 200.
225. One of the more complex and exclusive statutes was enacted by the State of
Illinois. That statute reads, in pertinent part:
(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted
for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if such former
prosecution:
(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination
that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction; or
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered
before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact
or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent
prosecution; or
(3) Was terminated improperly after the jury was impaneled and sworn
or, in a trial before court without a jury, after the first witness was
sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts, or after
a plea of guilty was accepted by the court ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993). In contrast to the
Illinois statute, a Mississippi statute relating to double jeopardy protection
merely states that
[elvery person charged with an offense committed in another state,
territory, or country may plead a former conviction or acquittal for
the same offense in such other state, territory, or country; and, if
such plea be established, it shall be a bar to any further proceedings
for the same offense here.
STAT. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-11-27 (1991).
226. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1992), which states as follows:
Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a
criminal prosecution under the laws of another State, Government,
or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he
is on trial, he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a sufficient
defense.
Id. In cases where a defendant has been charged by state and federal govern-
ments, or where a defendant has been charged by the State of California and
another state and the charged offenses contain different elements but are
essentially the same crime, this statute has been interpreted to grant more rights
to a defendant under the Exception than the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
People v. Belcher, 520 P.2d 385, 390-91 (Cal. 1974).
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courts must often resort to common law to determine when federal
and state charges are sufficiently similar to bar a second prosecution
under principles of double jeopardy. 227 The methods by which this
determination is made are often as varied as the statutes themselves.
While some states utilize the Blockburger test, 22 where each case
requires "proof of a different element, ' 229 other states utilize tests
that focus on whether the crimes with which a defendant is charged
spring from the same transaction 230 or the same conduct. 23
The recent case of Smith v. Lowe23 2 illustrates the difficulties
that mzy be encountered when a statutory bar to double jeopardy is
too vague. Kentucky's double jeopardy statute bars prosecution in
Kentucky if another state or the United States has concurrent juris-
diction for the offense and previously prosecuted the defendant. 233
Subsequent trials are barred after an acquittal or conviction that
involved the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof
of a fact not required in the other prosecution.2 14
In Lowe, the defendant was acquitted on federal charges of
disabling a truck.2 3 Because the conduct for which the defendant
stood accused resulted in the death of the truck's driver, 236 the
defendant was subsequently charged with murder in state court.237
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the second prosecution in
its court was barred, notwithstanding the nonmutuality of parties
227. Belcher, 520 P.2d at 392.
228. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
229. Id. at 304. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that the Blockburger test
must be applied to its statute barring successive prosecutions. See Smith v.
Lowe, 792 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1990).
230. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1993) (eliminating use of the
Exception if a defendant has been tried in federal court for the same conduct
during the same transaction); see also United States v. Engesser, 788 F.2d
1401, 1403 (9th Cir.) (holding that Montana's statute barring prosecution for
crimes previously prosecuted in other jurisdictions did not bar the federal
government from prosecuting charges which arose from the same incident as
the crime for which the defendant was previously prosecuted in Montana),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986). The term "same transaction" is defined by
statute. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-410 (1993). The statute bars, inter alia,
conviction of a lesser included offense and conviction of both conspiracy to
commit the offense and the offense itself. See id.
231. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1993). Although Georgia's statute uses language
prohibiting dual prosecutions for the same conduct, the statute expressly
excludes conduct that "requires proof of a fact not required in the other
prosecution," id. § 16-1-8(b)(l), which is essentially the Blockburger rule.
232. 792 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1990).
233. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993).
234. Id.
235. Lowe, 792 S.W.2d at 371-73.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 373.
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that is ordinarily fatal to a defendant's collateral estoppel defense. 238
The court reasoned that under Kentucky's statutory bar to double
jeopardy, the elements of the Blockburger test 23 9 should not be applied
in the "hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century
pleading book," ' 240 which would have permitted the second prosecu-
tion, but should rather be applied "with realism and rationality. ' 24'
Although Kentucky courts have demonstrated some flexibility in
interpreting their state's statutory bar to double jeopardy, Kansas
courts have taken a stricter approach with their state's statutory
prohibition against double jeopardy. The Kansas statute provides, in
pertinent part:
A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly
prosecuted in a district court of the United States or in a
court of general jurisdiction of a sister state or in the
-municipal court of any city of this state for a crime which
is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state, if such
former prosecution:
(a) resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the
subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each
prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the
other prosecution .... 242
The inclusion of the phrase "of the United States" in the Kansas
statute extends double jeopardy protection to defendants who are
successively prosecuted in federal and state courts. By including the
phrase "unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required
in the other prosecution, ' 243 the Kansas statute also addresses the
closely connected issue of what constitutes the same conduct between
sovereigns. If the charges require proof of different elements, the
defendant's conduct is not considered identical for purposes of a
subsequent prosecution. 244 If, however, the charges are identical in
each separate sovereign, the Kansas statute would protect the accused
against successive prosecutions.245
This statutory protection is illustrated in Kansas v. Henwood,2*
where a defendant who stole a car and crossed both Kansas and
238. See id. at 374-75.
239. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
240. Lowe, 792 S.W.2d at 374 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
241. Id.
242. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
243. Id. This phrase defines the Blockburger test, whereby each charge is examined
for its elements. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
244. See Kansas v. Henwood, 756 P.2d 1087, 1088-89 (Kan. 1988).
245. Id. at 1091.
246. 756 P.2d 1087 (Kan. 1988).
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Missouri territorial boundaries was first convicted of receiving a
stolen car under Missouri law. 247 Subsequently, the defendant was
prosecuted on the theft charge by Kansas authorities. 24 Although the
defendant asserted that the Kansas prosecution violated his right
against double jeopardy, the prosecution argued that the elements of
the Missouri and Kansas charges were different. 249 Specifically, the
prosecution asserted that its charge against the defendant required
that the theft be committed in Kansas, whereas the Missouri charge
required that the stolen car actually be received in Missouri. 20 The
court agreed that the elements of the charges were not identical if
consideration was given to differences in venue. 25' However, the court
ruled that differences in venue cannot be used as proof of a fact not
required in the other state's prosecution.2 5 2 Because all of the elements
of the Missouri charge were included within the Kansas charge,
Kansas was barred from reprosecuting the defendant under the
express limitations of the Kansas statute barring double jeopardy.2 53
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would render the Kansas
statute meaningless if double jeopardy protection was afforded to a
defendant based on pure venue requirements.2 5 4
The State of Arkansas also examined the elements of each charge
to determine whether a defendant is entitled to double jeopardy
protection under Arkansas law. The relevant Arkansas statute, which
permits an affirmative defense of double jeopardy for defendants
tried in concurrent state or United States jurisdictions, states as
follows:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this state and of the United States or another
state or territory thereof, a prosecution in any such other
jurisdiction is an affirmative defense to a subsequent pros-
ecution in this state . . . unless:
(A) The offense of which the'defendant was formerly con-
victed or acquitted and the offense for which he is subse-
247. Id. at 1087.
248. Id. at 1087-88.
249. Id. at 1089-90.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1090.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 1089-90. The Kansas statute does not bar successive prosecutions if the
factual elements are different. See Smith v. Atkins, 565 F. Supp. 721 (D. Kan.
1983). When that occurs, a prior federal prosecution will not bar a subsequent
state prosecution under the statute. Id. at 732 (holding that a prior federal
conviction on charges of bank robbery did not bar a subsequent state trial for
kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery under the state
statute).
254. Henwood, 756 P.2d at 1091.
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quently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required
by the other, and the law defining each of the offenses is
intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
255
The language of this statute reflects the legislature's intent to evaluate
both the substance of the crime and the harm to the state, and to
apply the Blockburger test 256 to the elements of the charges.
25 7
Accordingly, to avoid double jeopardy in the State of Arkansas,
a defendant previously tried in another jurisdiction must be prose-
cuted on different charges in Arkansas, and the defendant's conduct
must have resulted in substantially different harm to that state.
25 8
This dual requirement was recognized by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas in Bateman v. State,25 9 where a defendant convicted of
transportation of firearms in a federal district court was subsequently
convicted in Arkansas state court for receiving the same firearms as
stolen goods. 260 The supreme court conceded that arguably, under a
"proof of fact" test, the federal and state court charges against the
defendant would be different, 261 thus permitting a successive state
court prosecution. 262 However, even if the charges against the defen-
dant were found to be different, the prosecution did not redress a
harm substantially different from that already redressed by the trial
in federal court and the defendant's state court conviction was
reversed.
261
Thus, although Maryland and other states may be guided by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Exception, the enactment of
a statute similar to that of Arkansas may grant a defendant more
substantive rights. Of course, a state may alternatively enact a statute
limiting a defendant's rights against successive prosecutions, as has
the State of Louisiana. The Louisiana statute reads as follows:
255. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1993).
256. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Bateman v. State, 578 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Ark. 1979) (recognizing that
the Arkansas statute offers protection against double jeopardy when concurrent
jurisdictions seek to prevent substantially the same harm or evil, and the
elements of each charge are the same). The use of the conjunctive "and"
between the phrase identifying the same elements test and the phrase indicating
that substantially different harm or evil must be found is further evidence that
Arkansas intends for both tests to be applied. See Ark. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114
(Michie 1993).
258. Bateman, 578 S.W.2d at 217.
259. 578 S.W.2d 216 (Ark. 1979).
260. Id. at 217.
261. Id. The test referred to is essentially the Blockburger test. See supra notes 228-
29 and accompanying text.
262. See Bateman, 578 S.W.2d at 217.
263. Id. (finding neither prong of the dual requirement test satisfied).
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"Double jeopardy does not apply to a prosecution under a law
enacted by the Louisiana Legislature if the prior jeopardy was in a
prosecution under the laws of another state or the United States.'1 26
The clear and unambiguous meaning of this statute comports with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Exception.
265
D. Suggested Scholarly Alternatives to the Use of the Exception
As the subsequent parts of this Comment should illustrate, the
extent to which a defendant is protected by the prohibition against
double jeopardy varies according to the jurisdiction in which the
preclusive prosecution takes place. 26 6 These disparities have led a
number of scholars to propose changes to the Exception. One such
scholar, Walter T. Fisher, has suggested that the federal government
should merely apply its preemptive powers to foreclose state prose-
cutions in matters of high national priority and importance. 267 Fisher
has also proposed a more novel approach, whereby the accused is
permitted to select the court where prosecution will take place if
federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 261 Under Fisher's
proposal, if the defendant selects federal court, a subsequent state
prosecution is precluded if the federal prosecutor accepts the case
and obtains an indictment within a certain time period. 269 If the
federal prosecutor declines the case, however, the state may proceed
with its own prosecution. 270
Although this approach is indeed novel, it is problematic in at
least two respects. First, it conflicts with the notion of federalism
because a state may lose the ability to enforce its own laws. When
a state legislature passes laws, the legislature is held accountable to
its political constituents, whose individual rights are affected by those
laws. If Fisher's alternative is adopted, and a defendant chooses
federal court, that defendant will be able to unilaterally circumvent
the enforcement of state law.
The second major problem with Fisher's alternative approach is
the inherent disparity between the federal and' state criminal systems-
namely, the enhanced, mandatory sentencing utilized in the federal
264. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 597 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
265. See supra notes 30-39, 46-47 and accompanying text.
266. See sources cited supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
267. Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REV. 607,
610-13 (1966).
268. Id. Fisher recognized, however, that because Congress can remove state in-
volvement in matters where concurrent jurisdiction exists, historically vital areas
of concern such as civil rights may be retained exclusively by the federal courts.
Id. at 611.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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system. 27' For a defendant, the choice between state or federal courts
is not a choice between similar systems of justice, but rather the
lesser of two possible sentences. If a defendant chooses the federal
system in an effort to avoid double jeopardy, the defendant may be
subjected to mandatory sentencing. 272 On the other hand, choosing
the state system may subject the defendant to a subsequent prose-
cution in federal court. Furthermore, even if the sentencing between
the state and federal systems was comparable, flooding the federal
system to avoid double jeopardy would create new administrative
and economic problems. Fisher's proposal to allow the defendant a
choice of forum therefore does not seem to be a viable solution to
double jeopardy concerns.
Another scholarly alternative calls for the replacement of the
dual sovereignty doctrine by the unitary theory that relies on a
determination of the defendant's incremental culpability. 273 Both the
defendant and the defendant's intent to produce a harmful result are
closely scrutinized along a continuum of moral blame. 274 The degree
of the defendant's criminality is then contrasted with society's need
for retribution. 27 If society's need is great, and a second sovereign
prosecutes the defendant after an initial trial in another sovereign,
the prosecutor in the second trial must prove that the second pros-
ecution was justified by a societal need for retribution. 276 This balance
between the defendant's conduct and the need for retribution must
favor the second prosecution; otherwise, the second case will be
dismissed for failure to prove justifiable culpability. 277
The unitary theory is a more accurate reflection of the spirit
behind double jeopardy protection. Because the second trial is deter-
271. See generally Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining
the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61
(1993). The federal system uses a hybrid form of sentencing, combining strict
guidelines from Congress in the form of statutory minimums with conduct
driven mandatory sentencing guidelines from the United States Sentencing
Commission. Id. at 86-91.
272. See id. (discussing federal mandatory sentencing).
273. Dominic T. Holzhaus, Note, Double Jeopardy and Incremental Culpability: A
Unitary Alternative to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1706-11 (1986).
274. See id. at 1706.
275. See id. at 1706-11.
276. See id. at 1709-10 & n.62.
277. See id. In theory, the defendant would be convicted or acquitted in a first trial
on the merits of the case. Id. If a second sovereign, either federal or state,
brings subsequent charges against the defendant, the defendant may raise a
double jeopardy defense after the initiation of the second suit. Id. The burden
to continue with the second trial thus rests upon the prosecutor to prove
adequate culpability. Id. Regrettably, an exposure to pretrial proceedings is
inevitable, but a full trial will be avoided if the prosecution fails to meet the
test of incremental culpability. Id.
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mined on more than just territorial considerations, something more
than a wooden application of the Exception guides the courts. While
this is desirable, it is unfortunate that the ultimate decision to
reprosecute rests with a judge, rather than with the people through
the democratic process, where the decision should more properly
reside.
V. SUGGESTED REFORM
The wide variation between state and federal protections against
double jeopardy often impedes an individual's right to be free from
vexation and anxiety arising from repetitive criminal prosecutions.
Reform measures are necessary to guarantee the basic constitutional
protection against double jeopardy, especially where the trend of
woodenly applying the Exception creates an unjust loophole based
on meaningless, territorial considerations. The advantage gained by
this bright line application has the ironic effect of giving those living
in territories without statehood more protection than that which is
afforded to other citizens of the United States.
The self-policing of prosecutors encouraged by the Petite Policy
is also a similarly inefficient solution. Supreme Court justices have
been critical of the Policy's administration, evidencing a genuine
concern about manipulation of the system .27 Allowing prosecutors
to engage in a second trial, and then reversing the trial verdict at
the request of those prosecutors, suggests that the Petite Policy has
not always effectively guided the administration of scarce public
resources. Furthermore, because a defendant may not challenge the
Petite Policy on appeal, there is no check on a prosecutor's power
to use the second trial as a tool to coerce cooperation of a witness
or extract pleas. Accordingly, a first phase of reforming the consti-
tutional protection against double jeopardy would require a simple
codification of the Petite Policy into an administrative regulation
that may be challenged by a defendant when the Petite Policy is not
followed.
The second phase of reform requires legislative action and may
thus not be as easily accomplished as the first suggested phase of
reform. If the parameters of the issues inherent in double jeopardy
protection are defined through legislative action, the citizens of
Maryland will have uniform guidelines which control their important
substantive right not to be put in jeopardy twice. Perhaps more
importantly, legislative definition will allow for greater citizen par-
ticipation and legislative accountability in the judicial aspects of the
issues.
278. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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In formulating appropriate legislation to protect its citizens'
rights, Maryland would benefit from an examination of the statute
of its sister state, Delaware, which permits subsequent prosecutions
between state and federal jurisdictions only when "[t]he offense for
which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a
fact not required by the former offense and the law defining each
of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm
or evil." 27 9 This statute effectively requires the state prosecutor to
evaluate each case falling within the Exception by using both the
Blockburger test280 and an examination of the harm or evil caused
by the defendant's conduct.28
If desired, an additional safeguard could be added to the statute
in order to retain state prosecutorial discretion. That safeguard might
take the form of the following: A prosecution is not barred if the
former prosecution "[w]as procured by the defendant without the
knowledge of the proper prosecuting officer, and with the purpose
of avoiding the sentence which otherwise might be imposed. 282
Statutory regulation with this safeguard would also preserve the
choice of forum for the prosecution. 28 3
While enacting statutory protection against double jeopardy would
protect Maryland citizens, it would not usurp the federal govern-
ment's power to prosecute in areas of compelling national interest,
such as civil rights. Federal jurisdiction would still preempt the state
jurisdiction in those areas where it has been historically necessary or
in areas of federal statutory regulation. In fact, greater cooperation,
coordination, and participation of federal and state resources may
ultimately result from adherence to the true spirit of the constitutional
bar to double jeopardy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pervasive undermining of the constitutional right not to be put
in jeopardy twice continues to elude adequate justification. A person
tried once can never be fairly tried again without giving irreversible,
prejudicial advantage to the adversarial party. A policy that allows
a "dry run" at prosecution in one jurisdiction is inherently unfair
279. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209(1)(a) (1987).
280. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
281. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209(l)(a) (1987).
282. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/3-4(d)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994).
This safeguard is contained within an Illinois statute relating to double jeopardy
protection. See id.
283. Preserving jurisdictional decisions by the prosecution, without the opportunity
for double jeopardy, has the practical effect of forcing determinations of
incremental culpability at the outset.
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because of the advantage gained by observing the jury's reaction to
evidence and strategy. 284 Additionally, the tactical mistakes in the
first trial can be corrected in the second trial, 285 and any adverse
publicity or tension from the first trial may fester and create pressure
on the second jury to acquit or convict. 216 Obviously, any case of
sufficient magnitude will place pressures on a jury; these pressures
can be eliminated, however, in a second trial under a system prohib-
iting the use of the Exception, which is based purely upon territorial
considerations.
Finally, the ideal standard of equal justice for all is perhaps
even more fundamental than the basic right not to be put in jeopardy
twice. 28 7 An internal federal policy like the Petite Policy, which may
or may not be applied and is generally misunderstood, cannot foster
reassurance in the equal administration of the law. Furthermore, a
federal prosecution following a state prosecution for the same crim-
inal conduct directly conflicts with many state statutes and consti-
tutions limiting dual prosecutions. This conflict of laws is unnecessary
when state and federal interests are one.
Christina Galye Woods
284. Dawson, supra note 7, at 300.
285. Erwin Chemerinsky, How a Fair Trial Produced an Unfair Verdict, CONN. L.
TRIB., May 18, 1992 at 18 (indicating that federal prosecutors in the second
trial of Rodney King may benefit by their ability to correct errors in the first
trial, such as limiting the frequency of the jury's examination of the videotaped
beating and calling King to the stand).
286. Id. As Chemerinsky observed, the jurors in the federal trial of the officers
accused of beating Rodney King "could be influenced by knowledge that [the]
earlier [state] jury found the defendants not guilty. On the other hand-and
more important-future jurors obviously will fear that their voting for acquittal
or no liability could touch off another wave of urban violence." Id.
287. The concept of equal justice was deemed fundamental by Thomas Jefferson,
who wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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